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1 Principles of ESR Adjudication
The book examines the potential models of incorporation (ways of embedding
rights into domestic law) for economic and social rights (ESR) at the national
and devolved (subnational) level and the justiciability mechanisms (adjudication
by a court) that enable access to effective remedies in court for violations of ESR.
In so doing, the book develops principles of ESR adjudication (the building
blocks of good practice) and categorises justiciability mechanisms for ESR
enforcement at both the national and devolved level.
The book is written with a view to empowering rights-holders and those who sup-
port them by setting out routes to remedy for violations of rights and also exploring
options for long-term structural change. It is therefore also designed to provide deci-
sion makers and those exercising state power with feasible options for progressive
human rights reform. It contributes to the academic discourse whilst also engaging
with the practicalities of access to justice. The research tells us that there is
a significant legal accountability gap in the protection of ESR across the UK jurisdic-
tions and much of the international framework is ignored or rejected unless
incorporated.1 Human rights are conceptually framed in a way that excludes the oper-
ation and enforceability of ESR. Indeed, the national political discourse around social
rights is dominated by existing domestic human rights structures and our existing
domestic human rights structures marginalise ESR to the sidelines2 – such as forming
aspects of civil and political rights, or featuring as part of formal equality.3 This book
re-conceptualises human rights in the UK by bringing in both the devolved and inter-
national perspectives. By doing so it becomes clear that the human rights story in the
1 Katie Boyle, Models of Incorporation and Justiciability for ESC Rights, Scottish Human Rights
Commission (2018), available at www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1809/models_of_
incorporation_escr_vfinal_nov18.pdf
2 For a discussion on this see Paul Hunt, Social Rights Are Human Rights BUT THE UK SYSTEM
IS RIGGED, Centre for Welfare Reform (2017) available at www.centreforwelfarereform.org/
uploads/attachment/584/social-rights-are-human-rights.pdf
3 Katie Boyle and Edel Hughes, ‘Identifying Routes to Remedy for Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights’ (2018) 22 International Journal of Human Rights 43–69; Katie
Boyle, ‘The Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Scotland: Prospects for Mean-
ingful Enforcement’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review 110–116.
UK is much broader and much more complex than would first appear. The book
makes a contribution to the UK discourse but also provides incorporation models,
justiciability mechanisms and principles of adjudication that can apply elsewhere, con-
tributing to the wealth of discourse internationally on best practice for the protection
of ESR.
There are two key narratives on ESR at play and each one is engaged throughout
the book. The first of which has for some time accepted the legally enforceable status
of ESR and has been developing in both discourse and practice in international law
and comparatively. The devolved dialogue in Scotland, Wales and in Northern Ireland
(during the Bill of Rights process) is now more broadly engaged with the first of
these narratives. The second narrative, and the more prominent in the UK national
discourse, is that ESR are non-justiciable, cannot legitimately be enforced by a court,
contravene parliamentary supremacy and are aspirational in nature. These competing
narratives are difficult to reconcile, which in turn frustrates the process of making
a contribution to the discourse that is sufficiently advanced to build on the
existing research on the former narrative without being completely at odds with the
discourse surrounding the latter. This frustration engages with wider debates about
political v legal constitutionalism and the fact that different models co-exist concur-
rently across the UK constitutional framework (with the devolved jurisdictions per-
taining to a stronger form of legal constitutionalism).
This introductory chapter contextualises the book in terms of the theory of rights
and the status of ESR in the literature and discourse. It deals with arguments for and
against the status of ESR as legal rights and so begins by addressing the critical argu-
ments against the exploration of ESR as legally binding rights that can be enforced in
court (that they are ‘justiciable’). The book is premised on the basis that rights are
legally binding and justiciable if the application of the law renders them so (following
the positivist approach). This examination is also placed in wider social, economic and
cultural contexts in which the questions around justiciability are framed. Critically,
the research proposes principles of adjudication that address the critiques of ESR as
justiciable rights drawing on constitutional and deliberative democracy theory.
The book proposes the circumstances in which ESR justiciability can be made legit-
imately possible. As a precursor to this argument, however, it is necessary to briefly
address the reasons why ESR should receive any protection at all or whether it is
appropriate that they are defended and enforced through the court. The theoretical
framework in which the book is based rests on the premise that substantively securing
ESR is a good thing for the UK and its constituent parts, and a good thing for society
more generally. This position is based on certain assumptions drawn from moral and
legal philosophical considerations. It is also based on a theoretical framework in the
normative sense drawn from international standards and binding legal obligations
sourced from the international legal position.4 It is not proposed that models of
incorporation or justiciability are the only means in which to secure ESR. Rather it is
4 International law or international standards can act as a frame of reference for understanding
the rule of law value formation in liberal democracies.
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proposed that rendering the rights justiciable offers a more comprehensive system of
protection that can support other institutional mechanisms as, at the very least,
a means of last resort when other mechanisms fail.5
Theoretical Objections to ESR
The philosophical account of human rights in both theory and practice trad-
itionally follows a minimalist approach. Generally, this understanding of
rights can be explained in terms of right-holders (rights are held by everyone
and are universal) claiming rights against addressees (the state and private
persons) on the basis of urgent and specific claims of minimum (and progres-
sive) standards that are based on normative values with or without legal
recognition.6 King asserts that there is ‘near consensus’ amongst philosophers
of human rights that ESR are ‘real’ human rights.7 Nonetheless, the principal
arguments identified in a review of the sceptical perspective (those views that
are not within the ‘near consensus’ category) reveal legitimate concerns in
relation to the validity of ESR as viable human right claims in a theoretical
and philosophical sense.8
5 This is supported by the obligation to provide an effective remedy for a violation of an ESR in
accordance with international law, discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
6 James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2007), 9–10.
See also, Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17–58; Henry
Shue, Basic Rights and Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (2nd ed., Princeton University
Press, 1980); Amartya Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’ (2004) 32 Philosophy and
Public Affairs 315; James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008); Charles
R Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009); Marie-Bénédicte Dembour,
‘What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thoughts’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 1. By
moral considerations the book is referring to rights developed through a sense of political morality
such as social human rights or citizenship rights that might not necessarily have legal standing. By
legal rights the book is referring to rights that are afforded legal status in international law, legisla-
tion or constitutions. This distinction reflects that posited by King, at 19.
7 King, ibid. at 22. King states, ‘there has been a traditional resistance among philosophers to con-
sider social rights real human rights … however, [t]hese objections have now been dispatched
convincingly by what is emerging as a near consensus view among philosophers of human rights
that social rights are very much a species of human rights, largely for similar reasons accepted by
international lawyers and the UN system much earlier.’ See also Michael Freeman, ‘Conclusion:
Reflections on the Theory and Practice of Economic and Social Rights’, in Lanse Minkler (ed.)
The State of Economic and Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 365–386.
8 King and Freeman both systematically repudiate and countenance the arguments posed by
human rights sceptics regarding the existence or legitimacy of ESR. For a substantive analysis
of the sceptical arguments see the relevant chapters in King ibid. and Freeman, ibid. In brief,
they principally address the sceptical approach to enforceable human rights, in particular
social rights, as asserted by Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley
Head, 1969); Onora O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ (2005) 81 International
Affairs 427; James Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Provide and Protect’
(1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 77; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1991) inter alia.
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The literature for decades has engaged with dialectic philosophical trajectories
entailing the ebb and flow of ESR as legal rights proper. Cranston rejects ESR
because they cannot be universal in the same way as civil and political rights.
Employee rights, he declares, are not universal because not all humans are
employees – how then can this be a universal category? Likewise, Cranston
argues that they do not hold the same moral urgency as civil and political rights
(CPR), comparing for example the right to paid annual leave compared with the
right not to be tortured – ESR and CPR are not on an equal footing.9 Donnelly
rejects these arguments and countenances that not all CPR are universal
(such as the right to vote) and some ESR do hold moral urgency (such as the
right to food).10 O’Neill has argued that ESR are not feasible as legally enforce-
able rights. Drawing on Kant’s distinction between perfect obligations and
imperfect obligations, O’Neill questions how can right-holders claim obligations
to meet claims that have not been allocated to specific obligation-bearers? For
example, the right to food entails an imperfect duty dependent on charity or
beneficence and the hungry cannot identify who exactly is responsible for feed-
ing them. O’Neill has argued that to proclaim human rights without taking ser-
iously who has to do what to fulfil them is morally irresponsible.11 Sen has
rejected this position in that all human rights can entail aspects of imperfect
obligations – this does not mean they are not genuine rights.12 Thomas Pogge
argues that O’Neill is mistaken in assuming a requirement to identify a duty-
bearer in order to substantiate a genuine right using the end of slavery as an
example of an imperfect obligation with no specific duty-bearer but a right to
freedom from slavery is a right nonetheless.13 Nickel, less dismissive than Cran-
ston or O’Neill, highlights problems of applicability – human rights can only
require burdens that are feasible and feasibility is difficult to estimate. ESR,
Nickel argues, require institutional mechanisms of implementation.14 Rawls dis-
tinguishes ESR from ‘human rights proper’ and questions how can ESR be
human rights proper when they require specific institutions?15 This approach is
embedded in natural law theory that rights are natural and cannot presuppose
specific kinds of institutions, otherwise, they are not rights.16 This contrasts
with Nickel’s argument that institutions do not provide the justification of, but
9 See Maurice Cranston,What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1969).
10 Jack Donnelly, Universal Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2003).
11 Onora O’Neill, n 8.
12 Amartya Sen, ‘Human Rights and the Limits of the Law’ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review
2913.
13 Thomas Pogge, ‘O’Neill on Rights and Duties’ (1992) 43 Grazer Philosophische Studien 233.
14 James Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Provide and Protect’ (1993) 15
Human Rights Quarterly 77.
15 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
16 John Locke, Two Treaties of Government [1689], ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge University Press,
1988).
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rather the means of, implementing human rights.17 Some of these competing
theories are evident in recent debates about the democratic legitimacy of relying
on adjudication to support ESR enforcement. Gearty and Mantouvalou (dis-
cussed further below) debate the legalisation and judicial enforcement of rights.
Whilst Gearty highlights the insufficiency of relying on adjudication to fulfil
ESR Mantouvalou highlights the importance of embracing it as one means, out
of a variety of pathways, required to secure ESR.18
These arguments can be categorised into four overarching theoretical objections
that require consideration when examining the issue of ESR as legitimate and
legally enforceable rights. First, who is responsible for fulfilling ESR, or, who are
the duty-bearers as opposed to the rights-holders?19 Second, through what means
can ESR be legitimately enforced, or, what institutional mechanisms are necessary
for their fulfilment?20 Third, who should bear the cost of supporting these institu-
tional mechanisms? In relation to justiciable ESR mechanisms in the UK for
example, the burden of paying the considerable cost of fair access to legal justice as
it currently stands (in both civil and criminal matters) is a highly contested political
issue across the various jurisdictions21 and the subject of recent case law.22 And the
fourth objection, engages with arguments surrounding ‘incompossibility’, i.e. that
one ESR right may be conceptually, or empirically, incompatible with another.23
Addressing the Theoretical Objections
In relation to the first objection, Freeman responds with a positivist answer that
states have been identified as the primary bearer of responsibility for ESR in
international law.24 Gauri and Brinks identify a triangular relationship between the
17 James Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Provide and Protect’ (1993) 15
Human Rights Quarterly 77.
18 Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Hart, 2011).
19 Onora O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 427.
20 Freeman, n 7 at 375, ‘the most searching questions raised for defenders of economic and social
human rights by these [sceptical] philosophers are, firstly, O’Neill’s requirement that we need
to specify who is obliged to what in order to fulfill the rights, and, secondly, Nickel’s demand
that, for any human rights to be plausible, we must show that their fulfilment is feasible.’
21 Owen Bowcott and Nicola Brown, ‘More than Thousand Lawyers Protest Outside Parlia-
ment at Legal Aid Cuts’, The Guardian, 7 March 2014, www.theguardian.com/law/2014/
mar/07/lawyers-protest-parliament-legal-aid-cuts; Chris Kilpatrick, ‘Lawyers Slam David
Ford’s Plans to Cut Legal Aid Budget’, The Belfast Telegraph, 3 March 2014, www.belfasttele
graph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/lawyers-slam-david-fords-plan-to-cut-
legal-aid-budget-30056365.html; BBC ‘Scottish Legal Aid Reform Passed’, 29 January 2013,
available at www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-21245700
22 Unison case the court examined the social minimum with reference to finding the cost of tri-
bunal fees unlawful R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor
(Respondent) [2017] UKSC 51.
23 On the problem of ‘incompossibility’ in the theory of rights see Hillel Steiner, An Essay on
Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
24 Freeman, n 7 at 386.
Principles of ESR Adjudication 5
state, the providers and the recipients of ESR.25 The state (sitting at the top of the
triangular hierarchy) owes duties to the recipients of ESR through provision or the
allocation of resources, and fulfils duties via the providers through the regulation of
how ESR require to be addressed. The providers then owe private obligations to
the recipients through a horizontal application of ESR under the regulatory frame-
work put in place by the state. Providers can be either private authorities or public
bodies depending on how the regulatory framework is managed.26 The state is pri-
marily responsible as the duty-bearer (Freeman) and the operation of a triangular
relationship – where private providers can also be engaged in the fulfilment of (and
responsible for) duties under the regulatory framework, facilitates a better under-
standing of who is responsible for what at any one time (Gauri and Brinks). The
state may delegate its responsibility elsewhere by placing obligations on other
actors and affording such actors authority and responsibility to fulfil those obliga-
tions. Whilst other actors may be held to account for failure to comply with those
obligations (under a regulatory framework), the state remains the duty-bearer
throughout. In other words, it cannot completely displace its obligations even if it
has explicitly delegated that responsibility elsewhere.
In relation to the second objection, there are various different institutional
avenues through which the enforcement of ESR can be realised. In the welfare
state, for example, there are numerous institutional safeguards to ensure the
proper provision of welfare under the relevant welfare legislation. ESR enforce-
ment can also be achieved through the avenues of political representation, com-
plaints to the ombudsman or through processes such as internal complaint
systems, proactive engagement from the regulatory and inspectorate regime,27
or in tribunal decision-making.28 These implementation avenues are extremely
25 Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, ‘Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the Tri-
angular Shape of Social and Economic Rights’, in Gauri and Brinks (eds.), Courting Social
Justice, Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008), 11.
26 For example, consider how public authority obligations in relation to health or social care
may be provided by private bodies – the regulatory framework ought to encompass the pri-
vate obligations owed by the providers to the recipients of health or social care, even although
the duties are performed by private bodies that sit outside of the normal vertical relationship
between state and individual in the provision of rights. In the context of the book, the justi-
ciable mechanisms proposed identify the state as the primary bearer of responsibility and the
individual recipient as the primary holder of the right, however, private obligations are also
assessed in terms of third party providers where the state has outsourced the obligation.
27 David Barrett, ‘The Regulatory Space of Equality and Human Rights Law in Britain: The
Role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission’ (2019) 39(2) Legal Studies 247–265.
28 King, n 6 at 85–95. See also for example some of the more recent developments in this area
in relation to mainstreaming ESR through budgetary analysis. See Aoife Nolan et al., Human
Rights and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart,
2013); Rory O’Connell et al., Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State
Budget al.locations: Rights and Resources (Routledge, 2016). This is a multifaceted approach
to ESR compatibility and a critical contribution that facilitates a move towards substantive
change – within the context of this book it is argued that mechanisms such as this ought to
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important in the realisation of ESR. This book is largely concerned with the
role of the court and the justiciable enforcement of ESR. However, it is import-
ant to note that adjudication is not the first and last answer to ESR enforcement
or implementation. The court ought to be available as a means of last resort if
all other institutional safeguards fail. The role that the court can play as an
important institutional actor is explored in more detail below in tandem with
a discussion on the legitimacy of justiciability (i.e. addressing concerns relating
to institutional capacity, competence, the separation of powers, the allocation of
limited resources and the indeterminacy of ESR). Essentially the research dem-
onstrates that compliance with ESR requires the possibility of judicial supervi-
sion in order to hold other branches of the state to account – the court being
the only institutional body capable of being sufficiently independent to provide
the proper review and scrutiny of the actions of the legislature and the execu-
tive. The court therefore is indispensable to human rights protections in
a functioning democracy but should ideally be a means of last resort.
The third objection relates to access to justice and raises obstacles that are
difficult to overcome without a change in the political decisions to reduce the
allocation of funds to support legal aid across the UK. The literature demon-
strates that a gap in legal aid funding does not necessarily negate ESR being
addressed in court as financial and legal support can be sourced from charitable
interventions and public interest litigation by rights-orientated lawyers.29
Nonetheless, the reduction in the availability of legal aid poses several risks to
ESR adjudication. First, there is the danger that judicial decisions might redir-
ect state resources on a disproportionate basis towards those who are able to
fund litigation – exacerbating potential inequalities.30 Second, the cases that
are supported by charitable interventions are dependent on the interests of
third parties – meaning the prioritisation of some ESR issues over others with
the potential to render the most pressing concerns of the most marginalised
furthest from the deliberative court room.31 The objection to ESR on the
ground that the litigation would be too costly equally impacts on CPR, which
be in place before any question of justiciability is engaged with. However, where for example,
a procedural requirement is introduced to comply with ESR through budget analysis and this
is not adhered to the court would be an appropriate forum to remedy the failure – such as is
evident in the framework of the procedural duties under the Equality Act 2010.
29 See, for example, the different approaches employed in India, South Africa, Nigeria and Brazil
in Gauri and Brinks (eds.), Courting Social Justice (n 25). Public interest litigation is not fre-
quently employed in the UK context. This could be because there was until recent times
a relatively robust and comprehensive legal aid system in place. However, there is also different
rules relating to standing across the various jurisdictions of the UK (see Chapter 5) – public
interest litigation was historically illegal in the UK context and, although the English courts
began to hear interest group cases, this did not necessarily trickle down to devolved jurisdic-
tions. For a discussion on the historical reluctance and a more recent leniency (in England) see
Carol Harlow, ‘Public Law and Popular Justice’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 1.
30 Gauri and Brinks, ibid. at 22.
31 Ibid.
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are also resource intensive within the judicial system. So this objection relates
to the question of whether there is an obligation to enable effective remedies
for violations of human rights.
The objection alone does not render ESR outside the realm of legitimate and
enforceable rights – it comes down to the same arguments posed by Nickel in
response to sceptical arguments on the substance of human rights protection –
whether states should facilitate the development of appropriate institutional mech-
anisms to ensure the implementation of human rights obligations. Without the
appropriate provision of legal aid, human rights protection and access to justice, are
in a very perilous position, however, it does not render the rights any less real. If any-
thing, the duty to provide an effective remedy encompasses a right to facilitate access
to justice, forming an ESR right in itself. There have been significant steps taken by
the judiciary in recognition of the right to access justice.32 Most notably in the recent
UNISON case that declared prohibitively expensive tribunal fees as unlawful because
the fees impeded the constitutional and common law right to access justice.33
The fourth theoretical objection is based on the argument that ESR
compete against each other or are inherently incompatible based on issues of
incompossibility. This objection, similar to that above, impacts on CPR as well as
ESR and raises problems for the most uncontroversial human rights.34 It is not
unusual for a court, or other organ of the state, to assess conflicting rights and
determine which should take priority in any given situation – for example, the right
to freedom of speech of one person may impact on the right to privacy of another
and vice-versa. This objection can be addressed through a flexible concept of the
principle of indivisibility and applies to ESR in the same manner as that of CPR.
This book orientates arguments in favour of substantive rights-based justiciable
models. However, it is critical to acknowledge within any substantive system there
can be appropriate limitations and safeguards to ensure the appropriate balance
between rights can be secured, as can limitations on rights be employed through
many of the same mechanisms applied to CPR. It is not proposed that all ESR are
absolute and non-derogable. For example, the normative theoretical framework
sourced in international law recognises progressive realisation subject to maximum
available resources, together with absolute minimum core rights – this reflects
Koch’s sliding slope of enforcement discussed below in Chapter 2.
In addition to the arguments addressing the sceptical philosophical and theor-
etical objections, there are also a variety of normative theories that positively
support the claims of urgency and priority that ESR demand as legitimate
and enforceable human rights. The principle theoretical arguments that justify
the protection of human rights (including ESR) are based on the following
concepts: that human beings are entitled to a life of dignity and wellbeing
32 R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017]
UKSC 51, para.66–87.
33 Ibid.
34 Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Gauri and Brinks, n 25.
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(that each person is entitled to minimum standards/threshold of human rights
protection)35; that human beings are entitled to autonomy (that human rights
afford the individual freedom and that the protection of CP and ESR forms an
important part of self-determination)36; and human beings are entitled to social
and political participation in society (that meaningful participation in democracy
is dependent on substantive access to at least minimum criteria in CP and ESR
protection).37
This reasoning aligns with the emerging ‘anti-poverty’ stream of liberal
constitutionalism.38 The concept that, at the very least, a minimum of ESR pro-
tection (as well as CPR) is required in order to fulfil the basic functions of
autonomy and that ignoring the socio-economic dimension of citizenship under-
mines a fully functioning democracy. Indeed, some argue that the human rights
framework itself not gone far enough to address systemic inequality and that states
35 Ibid. See also Gauri and Brinks, n 25 – ‘a life that achieves the full promise of human dignity
requires, among other things, escape from premature death, the resources to withstand debili-
tating disease, the ability to read and write, and, in general, opportunities and freedoms
unavailable in the midst of extreme poverty and deprivation.’
36 Ibid., 23–24. See also: Cécile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and
the Decent Life (Oxford University Press, 2001), Chapter 1; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Free-
dom (Oxford University Press, 1986), Chapters 14 and 15. Raz theorises that autonomy (or
normative agency) is a prerequisite of freedom and that the exercise of autonomy is depend-
ent on the self-fulfilling creation of an autonomous individual, an ‘agent’, where the agent’s
activities are not burdened by worries of mere survival. An autonomy supporting environment
requires that agents have capacity, a range of valuable options and are free from coercion and
manipulation. See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001). Rawls theory, based on liberal egalitarianism, supports freedom through mean-
ingful choices about the life one chooses to lead – this requires having the capacity to under-
stand political complexities (supported through education) and having health and income
security to plan out a meaningful life. This can be supported by constitutionally guaranteeing
legally enforceable minimum criteria, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1996), 227–228. This position somewhat differs from the distinction previ-
ously asserted by Rawls in relation to ‘human rights proper’ (n 15) – Rawls’ theory develops
towards a more substantive based recognition that minimum criteria are essential to social
and political participation.
37 King, n 7 at 23. See also arguments supported in theories of social citizenship, civic repub-
licanism and deliberative democracy – ESR are instrumental in, and support, meaningful
participation in political decision making. Frank I. Michelman, ‘Welfare Rights in
a Constitutional Democracy’ (1979) 3 Washington University Law Quarterly 659; Fabre,
ibid., 121–124; David Miller, ‘A Human Right to Democracy?’ CSSJ Working Papers
Series, SJ032 April 2015.
38 See O’Cinneide on the lack of a social dimension in liberal constitutionalism and the emer-
ging anti-poverty dimension in mainstream liberal political theory and Michelman in Colm
O’Cinneide ‘The constitutionalisation of economic and social rights’ and Frank
I. Michelman on antipoverty liberalism as an emerging conceptualisation of social democ-
racy, ‘Constitutionally Binding Social and Economic Rights as a Compelling Idea: Recipro-
cating Perturbations in Liberal and Democratic Constitutional Visions’ in García et al.
(eds.), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice, Critical Inquiries (Routledge,
2015), 261–262 and 279–280.
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must move beyond minimum criteria if substantive equality is to be achieved.39
The international human rights framework offers a helpful framework for moving
beyond social minimum thresholds. A foundation of ESR protection recognising
minimum and progressive thresholds is required to guide the legislature and execu-
tive as to human rights compliance. Likewise, both the legislature and the judiciary
can build upon this foundation to give greater substance and meaning to rights as
epistemic communities responsible for their substantive interpretation.40
The adjudication of ESR and the measurement of its success is incredibly
complex. There are so many different factors to consider such as accessibility,
standing, the degree of protection of the right in law (the domestic law may not
in any way meet the standards required in international law for example), the
type of review the court might employ, what kind of remedies are available and
the degree of compliance post-judgment. There are many problems that social
rights adjudication in practice will encounter across these many different factors.
For example, Landau provides the example of the development of the tutela
device under the Colombian constitution as a means of protecting a vital min-
imum for the most vulnerable to its subsequent misuse serving the health needs
of the middle classes.41 In Brazil, similarly, the allocation of funds in society
moved from the poorest to the wealthy when the jurisprudence of the Brazilian
courts recognised an immediately enforceable right to the highest attainable
health causing greater health inequities as the more privileged and wealthy
sought rights enforcement through the court.42 In India and South Africa,
social rights adjudication has engaged with a wide plethora of social rights.
However as noted by Kaletski et al., although India and South Africa have
strong legal guarantees to the right to food for example, both countries con-
tinue to exhibit exceptionally high rates of malnutrition.43 In fact, in South
Africa, where the Constitutional Court has intervened to protect social rights,
critics have questioned the genuinely transformative nature of the remedies
employed and argued that the jurisprudence has undermined the norm-based
39 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough, Human Rights in an Unequal World (Harvard University Press,
2018). Moyn’s account, whilst helpful in elucidating some of the pitfalls of inadequate legal
structures largely concerned with civil and political rights, is misplaced in its understanding of
the economic and social rights dimension of the international legal framework and its poten-
tial if properly implemented. For a critique see Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Shaming Human Rights’
(16 August 2018), Forthcoming, International Journal of Constitutional Law; NYU School
of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 18–47, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3233063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3233063
40 Katharine Young, Constituting Social Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.
41 David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International
Law Journal 189.
42 Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health
Inequities?’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights: An International Journal 33.
43 Elizabeth Kaletski, Lanse Minkler, Nishith Prakash and Susan Randolph, ‘Does Constitution-
alizing Economic and Social Rights Promote Their Fulfillment?’ (2016) 15(4) Journal of
Human Rights 433–453 at 456.
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foundationalist nature of the Constitution.44 These issues give rise to problems
for social rights adjudication in terms of its democratic legitimacy. At the same
time, they by no means undermine it as a means of rights enforcement
completely.
The Critiques of ESR Adjudication
To date, the analysis of social rights adjudication has focussed to a large
degree on the taxonomy of obligations along the respect-protect-fulfil axis.45
As the analysis of jurisprudence develops according to the taxonomy of obliga-
tions and across jurisdictions so too does the broader understanding of social
rights adjudication and new categories and principles emerge.46 Principles of
good practice in ESR jurisprudence can mitigate potential problems building
on a theoretical framework for ‘democratic legitimacy’ in social rights
adjudication.47 Whilst the focus of this book is developing good practice in
the context of the UK, the principles of adjudication can act as an assessment
framework on a cross-constitutional comparative basis.
Categorising justiciability mechanisms in the book offers new perspectives
on the type of enforcement available for ESR whether that be through explicit
justiciability enabling provisions or adjudication that occurs under the rubric of
something else. In this sense, we can measure both the degree of protection
(a taxonomy of obligations) as well as the mechanism through which the
rights can be enforced (a taxonomy of justiciability mechanisms). As part of this
taxonomy of justiciability mechanisms consideration should also be given to:
the sources of law from which social rights adjudication derives, i.e. the means
of incorporation (constitutional/legislative/international/common law etc.);
the mechanism under which the action can be taken (is it a constitutional
44 See, for example, Marius Pieterse, ‘Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional
Entitlements to Health Care Services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights
473; Sandra Liebenberg and Beth Goldblatt, ‘The Interrelationship between Equality and
Socio-Economic Rights under South African’s Transformative Constitution’ (2007) 23 South
African Journal of Human Rights 335; and Christopher Mbazira, ‘From Ambivalence to Cer-
tainty: Norms and Principles for the Structural Interdict in Socio-Economic Rights Litigation
in South Africa’ (2008) 24 South African Journal of Human Rights 1.
45 Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social Rights, From Practice to Theory’
in M. Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and
Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 12.
46 Langford, ibid. at 13. For example, Nolan et al. identify degrees of enforcement through the
tripartite theory to a multitude of varying degrees – from respect, to protect, to fulfill, consid-
eration of progressive realisation and finally non-retrogressive measures, Nolan et al., The Jus-
ticiability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal (Human Rights Consortium,
March 2007). Courtis has expanded this theory to degrees of standard starting with negative,
to procedural, through equality and non-discrimination, minimum core arguments, progres-
sive realisation and prohibiting retrogression, Christian Courtis, ‘Standards to Make ESR Jus-
ticiable: A Summary Explanation’ (2009) 2 Erasmus Law Review 379.
47 King, n 7.
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provision? Or under equality law? Or under the rubric of civil and political
rights?); the degree of accessibility (relating to standing/legal aid/victimhood);
the type of review (what kind of judicial scrutiny is employed? Is it a weak or
strong review?); to what degree is the right enforced (is the duty procedural or
substantive? respect-protect-fulfil?); what kind of remedy is available (is it
declaratory? Ultra vires? Structural? Supervisory? Participatory?); in what kind of
body does the adjudication occur (quasi-court? International court? Domestic
constitutional court? – are the decisions binding?); and to what degree is there
compliance with the judgment (enforceability post-judgment? Long-term mater-
ial or symbolic impact?).48
In this sense, the way through which social rights can be adjudicated upon can
be assessed across the ‘adjudication journey’ rather than focussing solely on the
outcome of judgments. In so doing it is important to contextualise existing juris-
prudence within the broader building blocks of ESR adjudication allowing the
reader to reflect on the types of cases that do not, or cannot, reach the court
room as well as the processes and outcomes associated with the cases that do.
As part of this reflection, principles emerge to counteract some of the long-
held and more recently asserted criticisms of social rights adjudication.
Criticism of ESR jurisprudence comes in two distinct waves. The first wave of
criticism can be understood as the critique applied before judicially enforceable
ESR are introduced in any particular setting – i.e. the very repudiation of ESR
as justiciable from the outset. This first critical wave can be sub-categorised as the
‘anti-democratic critique’; the ‘indeterminacy critique’ and the ‘incapacity
critique’. The second critical wave rejects the justiciability of ESR in a post-
adjudication setting and rather than repudiate the justiciable nature of ESR
highlights the risks and inefficiencies of relying on ESR adjudication based on the
dangers of the court becoming an exercise of elite-driven power. The second
critical wave critique is sub-categorised as the pro-hegemonic critique. Both
critical waves are discussed below.
The first wave anti-democratic critique questions whether the court can
legitimately interfere in resource dependent policy areas usurping the power of
the legislature or executive. So the argument goes, parliament provides sufficient
accountability in ensuring the executive abides by human rights obligations at
the domestic and international level. Resource allocation by definition ‘impli-
cates the interests of nearly everyone [as] we nearly all pay in and take out of
the public system’49 and so the most appropriate decision maker in relation to
resource allocation is the representative legislature.50 The judiciary interfering in
the policy matters of the state impinges on the separation of powers and the
48 Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito and Julieta Rossi (eds.), Social Rights Judg-
ments and the Politics of Compliance: Making It Stick (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
49 King, n 7 at 5.
50 This argument is also closely related to that of polycentricity whereby a holistic understanding
of policy implications cannot be something that the judiciary can review on a case-by-case
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judiciary should not be able to veto parliamentary decisions. As articulated by
Gerard Hogan J.:
if social and economic rights are made justiciable and are vindicated by the
courts, the result will tend to distort the traditional balance of the separ-
ation of powers between the judiciary and other branches of government in
that more power will flow to the judiciary.51
However, CPR are also resource dependent and at times also require the
court to intervene as an accountability mechanism. When the court intervenes in
civil and political rights determination it does so as an important accountability
check on the executive or legislature rather than as a means of usurping the
power of other branches of government. One way in which this can occur is to
use different types of remedies – some of which may afford larger degrees of
deference back to decision makers depending on the circumstances. The court
as an intervener in the enforcement of ESR is therefore an important part of
a multi-institutional dialogue ensuring accountability rather than a transfer of
political power to the judiciary. Ultimately, in a system of parliamentary suprem-
acy, the final decision rests with the central legislature.
A response to anti-democratic critique embraces the democratic legitimacy of
courts embracing their role as an important accountability mechanism52 in
a multi-institutional dialogue, or ominlogue,53 given that there are multiple
actors in colloquium at the same time. King highlights the importance of ESR
to social citizenship, and a social minimum, enforceable by the courts as part
of a deliberative democracy framework.54 O’Cinneide similarly identifies strands
of constitutional theory that require the legal enforcement of ESR. The first of
these strands is a ‘legitimation-worthy’ constitutional order55 whereby ESR
support autonomous participation in society. The second strand identifies that
there should be a social dimension, or ‘social principle’ embedded in the rule of
law through a constitutionalisation of ESR. This would open the door to help
ensure ESR are prioritised when weighted against other competing interests.56
The third identifies that legal enforcement of ESR corresponds with democratic
basis. The legislature and executive are the appropriate bodies to deal with those issues that
require consideration of a vast number of interconnected variables. Ibid., 5–6.
51 Gerard Hogan, ‘Judicial Review and Social and Economic Rights’ in William Binchy and
Jeremy Sarkin (eds.), Human Rights, the Citizen and the State: South African and Irish
Approaches (Dublin: Roundhall, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 8.
52 Nolan et al., n 46, 15, para.2.2.
53 Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’ (1995) Journal of Philosophy 132, 140 as discussed in Rory
O’Connell, Legal Theory in the Crucible of Constitutional Justice (Dartmouth: Ashgate,
2000).
54 King, n 7 at 27.
55 Frank I. Michelman, ‘Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away’
(2008) 6(3&4) International Journal of Comparative Constitutional Law 663–686 at 675.
56 O’Cinneide, n 38 at 270.
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principles by ensuring that the politically marginalised groups have a legal mech-
anism through which their distributive justice claims can be communicated in
a manner that compels governments and other duty-bearers to respond to their
claims through deliberative (judicial) processes.57 The principles of deliberative
democracy developed here relating to accessibility, participation, deliberation
and counter-majoritarianism therefore form important responses to the demo-
cratic legitimacy critique in the context of social rights adjudication.
The indeterminacy critique of ESR adjudication tells us that ESR are too vague
and that their substantive interpretation should not be left to judges. This too is
a legitimate concern, however, it is not insurmountable. In the same way that civil
and political rights require interpretation, so too do ESR – and in a similar vein,
courts can play an important role in giving substance to ESR in the same way that
they do with CP rights.58 This does not require the court to usurp the role of the
legislature or executive. If the legislature gives clear instructions to the court on
how to interpret rights it can assist in the court fulfilling its role as a guarantor of
rights and thus avoiding abdication of this important judicial function.
A response to the indeterminacy critique identifies the role the court must
embrace as a body responsible for giving meaning to rights. Young tells us social
rights adjudication is nothing more than finding consensus between epistemic
communities – including the judiciary – around the meaning of rights.59 It is in
the dialogue between epistemic communities (legislative, executive, judicial) that
social rights adjudication can help give meaning to rights, a role that Michelman
argues courts should not abdicate.60 Rather than completely abdicate its role the
court must strike the right balance so that it does not ‘debase dangerously the
entire currency of rights and the rule of law’ by failing to engage with the ESR.61
The principle of deliberation, between institutions and actors at the local, national
and supranational level can help the court interpret the substance of ESR by
deriving meaning from a number of interpretative sources.
O’Cinneide highlights the importance of embracing both the procedural and
substantive aspects of this role. Otherwise, the court risks embracing only
a hollow form of ESR adjudication that abdicates on enforcing substantive
rights when needed:
At the end of the day, the legitimacy of SER review will depend on the
extent to which it succeeds in giving substance to SER whilst integrating
their protection into the wider framework of constitutional values…It is
only through a close, passionate and reasoned engagement with the
57 Ibid.; see also Kathrine G. Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012), 193 and Gauri and Brinks, n 25.
58 Young, ibid. at 30.
59 Young, ibid. at 8.
60 Michelman, n 55 at 683.
61 Ibid.
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normative substance of these rights that socially engaged constitutionalism
can take root in national legal systems and avoid the hollowed-out fate of
its social democratic predecessor.62
There is an important component of social rights adjudication that departs from
traditional understandings of deliberative democracy in its narrower interpret-
ation. A broader conceptualisation recognises that fairness must account for
both procedural and substantive justice – moving from a thin-to-thick conceptu-
alisation of justice. The process principles of accessibility, participation, deliber-
ation and counter-majoritarianism require the court to play a role in giving
meaning to rights through legitimate and fair processes. This manifests itself in
adjudication that reviews the procedural fairness of decision-making – was it rea-
sonable?/was it proportionate?/has the duty-bearer complied with fair process?
On the other hand, there is also a call within deliberative democracy theory
itself,63 and within the wider social rights discourse,64 that the court when
called upon may be required to enforce a substantive threshold (moving from
procedural to substantive enforcement). Liebenberg highlights that ‘[d]espite its
pervasiveness in social rights adjudication, the relationship between participatory
[as a component of procedural] justice and the substantive dimensions of social
rights remains unsettled’.65 In terms of the principle of fairness, the book pro-
poses both procedural and substantive concepts of fairness must be considered
as part of the remit of courts. It may not always be necessary, or appropriate,
for the court to enforce a substantive threshold. On the other hand, the more
serious the violation, the more necessary for a substantive ‘thicker’ concept of
justice to be developed and enforced. The example seen in the Hartz IV case
where the judiciary found the process in calculating social security entitlement
flawed as well as the substantive level of social security offered highlights the
potential of the court to review and determine the procedural fairness of
a decision as well as the substantive fairness of the outcome.66
62 O’Cinneide, n 38 at 274.
63 i.e. provision of the social minimum as the substantive threshold required to participate in
society. See the extensive literature cited in King at 26–27. See also Sandra Fredman, ‘Adjudi-
cation as Accountability’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds.), Accountability in the
Contemporary Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2013), 105.
64 See Anashri Pillay, ‘Toward Effective Social and Economic Rights Adjudication: The Role of
Meaningful Engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732–755;
O’Cinneide, n 38 at 274; Langford (2008) n 45, Boyle (this volume); Sandra Fredman, ‘Proced-
ure or Principle: The Role of Adjudication in Achieving the Right to Education’ (2015) 7 Consti-
tutional Court Review 165–199; David Bilchitz, ‘Avoidance Remains Avoidance: Is It Desirable
in Socio-Economic Rights Cases?’ (2015) 5 Constitutional Court Review 297.
65 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Participatory Justice in Social Rights Adjudication’, (2018) 18(4)
Human Rights Law Review 623–649.
66 BVerfGE 125, 175 (Hartz IV), the German Constitutional Court considered the decision
making process to be flawed and that the substantive outcome resulted in a violation of the
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Third, the capacity critique tells us that courts do not have the capacity to
deal with ESR, that there would be a flood of litigation and that judges do not
have the expertise to determine the substance ESR or their complex relationship
with other areas of governance. The judiciary simply lacks the expertise to decide
such matters and it is beyond the institutional capacity of the courts. When the
UK Human Rights Act was introduced Edwards firmly rejected the competency
of the judiciary in adjudicating on human rights issues calling instead for
the principle of due deference to parliament to be firmly established.67 On socio-
economic issues arising in human rights cases he argued that:
the judiciary are institutionally incompetent to deal with the socio-
economic issues that frequently arise in these cases. Not only is adjudication
an inappropriate process for assessing complex issues of policy, but the
courts also lack the resources and the judiciary the training and expertise to
adequately weigh the issues.68
However, courts can also help support their capacity by seeking expertise on
ESR where needed, including the appointment of amicus curiae (a ‘friend of the
court’) if required. In the same way the court can draw on expertise in relation to
CP or constitutional matters it can also refer to various sources of law, compara-
tive case law, international guidance as well as domestic experts in order to assist
in capacity building when adjudicating ESR. When ESR engage with far-reaching
policy considerations the court can ask the legislature or executive to justify its
approach, in the same way that it does so in relation to CP rights. The complexity
of adjudication in the area of human rights cuts across all different types of
rights – it is not unique to the ESR domain. It is important to remember that
CPR as well as ESR have core components that may be non-derogable as well as
components subject to limitation if justifiable. A more nuanced understanding of
the nature of ESR helps contextualise the different ways in which the court can
appropriately review ESR compatibility in a democratically legitimate way.
A response to this critique would be embed a theory of justification to questions
of capacity in whatever approach is taken at any time. This approach is facilitated
by the principles of deliberation and participation by encouraging engagement
with the relevant stakeholders and expertise to inform judicial decision-making.
The second wave of ESR adjudication criticism can be categorised as an ad
hoc critique – that adjudication of ESR does not work in practice based on
examples of failed attempts. This critique identifies that courts may be inappro-
priate forums for resolving disputes around ESR and can be distilled as the
right to dignity meaning the decision maker had to revisit both process and substantive out-
come of the decision. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
67 Richard Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 65 Modern Law
Review 859, 859.
68 Ibid.
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pro-hegemonic critique. The court itself embodies an elite-driven exercise of
power that reinforces existing inequalities. The second wave critique claims
that social rights adjudication does not help the most vulnerable and does not work
in practice.69 For example, in Brazil an overwhelming number of cases have been
filed relating to access to healthcare.70 Of these cases, over 90% are individuals
going to courts for specific benefits, rather than collective suits asking for structural
change.71 Ferraz carried out extensive empirical research with lawyers in Brazil that
investigated the reasons for the high number of individual cases seeking individual
court orders on access to healthcare.72 The research suggests that although there
are no formal barriers to collective suits lawyers are reluctant to pursue a holistic
collective case because the court will be resistant to these types of claims. In a civil
law jurisdiction this has meant that those who have been able to afford to raise indi-
vidual cases have had their right to healthcare secured to the detriment of those
who cannot afford (or do not know about) judicial enforcement of ESR.73 As
a result, there has been an increase in health inequities in Brazil.
Gearty makes persuasive arguments against relying on the judicial enforcement
of socio-economic rights, the first three of which relate to the first wave of ESR
critiques (i.e. that they afford too much power to the courts and so are
undemocratic; that they are too vaguely expressed; and the courts are not the
correct forum for determining resource allocation and prioritisation – again
relating to polycentricity).74 In addition to this he makes a further case against
legalisation by arguing that individual test cases in adversarial proceedings are
not equipped to deal with plight of ‘thousands of invisible claimants’; that the
inappropriateness of the adversarial model to the resolution of broadly framed
issues of social rights; that judicialisation offers no follow-up procedure to check
whether the decision of the court has been implemented; that seeking ‘quick-
fixes’ through the courts wastes the resources of organisations and institutions
seeking to advance social rights when they should be focussing on political
change; and finally that there is a danger in empowering a privileged judiciary
who will seek to retain the status quo (and concern that the powerful will seek
to assert their own social rights as an indirect means of resisting the social rights
of others relating to the pro-hegemonic critique).75
69 See, for example, the key findings by Ferraz, n 42; Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘Harming the
Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from Brazil’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review
1643; and Landau, n 41 where the court becomes a pro-majoritarian actor upholding the
rights of the wealthy to the detriment of the poorer when adjudicating ESR.
70 See Landau, n 41 and Ferraz, n 42.
71 Landau, Ibid.
72 Ferraz, n 42.
73 Landau, n 41 and Ferraz, n 69.
74 Joint Committee of Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?’ (Twenty-ninth Report of
Session 2007–2008, HL 165, HC 150) para.167.
75 Gearty and Mantouvalou, n 18; Gearty at 56–64.
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A response to this critique recognises that the court can also act as an
important accountability mechanism and ‘institutional voice’ for those who are
politically disenfranchised.76 In fact, the courts should take steps to embrace
counter-majoritarian adjudication.77 The legal constitutionalisation and adju-
dication of rights can help support pathways to social justice, among other
avenues.78 In addition, it must be noted that the end result of other avenues
may indeed lead to legalisation of ESR – for example, where civil society pres-
sure coalescing with political impetus results in human rights reform that
embeds ESR as legal rights (such as evident in Scotland and Wales discussed in
Chapter 6). How then should the different branches of power respond to this
change? More appropriate remedies are required to help the court embrace
this role such as the deployment of structural remedies when systemic issues
arise.79 In a broader social context questions must also be asked about the
appointment of judges and the makeup of the judiciary more closely reflecting
the diversity of society.80
The first and second waves of criticism highlights important issues that require
to be addressed, however, these concerns are not insurmountable barriers and
should not result in the outright rejection of ESR justiciability or judicial
enforcement. Holding firmly to the ESR critiques as evidence of the non-
justiciability of rights is now an outdated position.81 ESR adjudication happens
and it can happen in a legitimate way. As such it has become increasingly clear
that the outright repudiation of ESR justiciability is based on a false premise
from the outset. It has been posited that ‘much of the doctrinaire debate about
economic, social, and cultural rights throughout the second half of the last cen-
tury sprang from a legal fiction: that of the separation of human rights into two
distinct sets’.82 This dichotomy and misunderstanding on the legal status of
ESR is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Importantly, the research tells us
76 King, n 7; O’Cinneide, n 38; Nolan et al., n 46; Mantouvalou, ibid.
77 Landau, n 41.
78 Mantouvalou, n 75 and Paul O’Connell, ‘Human Rights: Contesting the Displacement
Thesis’ (2018) 69(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 19–35.
79 Landau, n 41 and César Rodríguez-Garavito and Diana Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Depriv-
ation on Trial, the Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South
(Cambridge University Press, 2015).
80 For a discussion on the potential of judicial diversity and the associated extensive literature see
Rosemary Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’
(2015) 68(1) Current Legal Problems 119–141.
81 This being the case in international law. A blanket refusal to acknowledge the justiciable nature of
ESC rights is considered arbitrary by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9:
The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para.10.
82 Mónica Feria Tinta, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-
American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and
Notions’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 431, 432.
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does not help the most vul-
nerable and does not work
in practice
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dication can help support path-
ways to social justice
(Mantouvalou 2011)
Legislation alone has blind
spots (King 2012)
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political representation (Nolan
et al 2007)
Politics is more appropriate
route to social justice (Gearty
2011)
More appropriate remedies are
required and courts must
engage with procedural and
substantive components of ESR
Weak review does not help
poorest (Landau 2012)
(Continued )
that is not ‘whether’ but ‘how’ to judicially enforce ESR that is the question
that remains to be addressed.83
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Clearly, there are aspects of ESR justiciability that are problematic. How then,











2015) Pillay 2012) (Fredman
2015)
Structural interdicts and positive
enforcement of rights when
appropriate (Landau 2012)
Access to justice must be
accessible and affordable
(Boyle, this volume)
Courts must defend those who
are most disadvantaged and
politically marginalised (Nolan
et al. 2007)
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ter- majoritarian judicial
approach including the use of
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with systemic issues (Landau
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Institutional capacity of courts
revisited – tendency to deal
with individual instead of col-
lective. In Brazil the civil law
jurisdiction created
a disproportionate tendency
towards individual claims with-
out precedent or collective sys-
temic response (Landau 2012)
Social rights adjudication is
causing health inequities in
Brazil (Ferraz 2009)
83 Mark Tushnet, ‘A Response to David Landau’ (2013) Opinio Juris, available at http://opinio
juris.org/2012/01/23/hilj_tushnet-responds-to-landau/As; O’Cinneide (2015) also points
out – the questions of whether and how to enforce ESR are closely linked n 38 at 273.
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basic principles of ESR adjudication that require to be taken into account when
considering the role of the court as a guarantor of ESR?
One possibility relies on the distinction between weak and strong forms of judicial
review, discussed by Tushnet.84 Weak-form systems of judicial review hold out the
‘promise of reducing the tension between judicial review and democratic self-
governance’ by ensuring deference to the other branches of government on issues
engaging with ESR.85 Weaker review includes mechanisms such as reasonableness
review86; an interpretative mandate87; non-binding declarations of incompatibility88
and a ‘dialogic’ mode of review.89 Strong-review systems on the other hand see
a more intense tension between judicial enforcement of constitutional limitations and
democratic self-government.90 A strong-review approach means judicially enforceable
constitutional provisions even in cases where there is reasonable disagreement about
interpretation.91 A strong-review approach recognises ESR as justiciable, immediately
enforceable and on a par with CPR.92 Under Tushnet’s weak v strong form judicial
review courts can either lean towards usurping the elected branches of government
thus risking the democratic legitimacy of their role, or, they can lean towards rejecting
the justiciability of ESR all together abdicating their democratically legitimate role of
giving meaning to rights and holding the other branches of government
accountable.93 Tushnet suggests that courts must adopt and adapt to a more nuanced
form of weak review for ESR therefore overcoming the democratic legitimacy critique
by applying tentative weak-form remedies before engaging in stronger interventions
where necessary.94
Garavito and Franco develop Tushnet’s dyad by introducing an intermediate
category: a ‘moderate rights’ approach.95 Under a moderate-rights approach the
court can recognise the reviewability, justiciability and enforceability of ESR but
strike the appropriate ‘democratic legitimacy’ balance by issuing moderate rem-
edies when a violation occurs. They argue that strong remedies require precise,
84 Mark Tushnet, ‘Weak Courts, Strong Rights’: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 23.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Including the interpretative approach used under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998,
Tushnet, ibid. at 25.
88 Including the declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, Tushnet, ibid. at 29.
89 including constitutional provisions such as the override (section 1) and notwithstanding (sec-
tion 33) clauses in the Canadian constitution, Tushnet, ibid. at 31.
90 Tushnet, ibid. at 22.
91 This is particularly apparent in the US constitutional setting where under a strong-review
model there is little recourse when the courts interpret the Constitution reasonably but in the
reasonable alternative view of a majority (of people), mistakenly. Tushnet, ibid. at 2922.
92 Garavito and Franco, n 79 at 10.
93 Sandra Liebenberg and Katherine Young, ‘Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can
Democratic Experimentalism Help?’ 237–258 at 239; and O’Cinneide, n 38 at 274; and
Frank I. Michelman, at 287 in Helena Garcia et al., n 38.
94 Tushnet, n 84 at 238.
95 Garavito and Franco, n 79 at 10.
Principles of ESR Adjudication 23
outcome-orientated orders whereas weak remedies tend to leave implementation
back in the hands of government agencies.96 Moderate remedies on the other
hand, can outline procedures and broad goals, as well as criteria and deadlines
for assessing progress whilst at the same time leave decisions on means and pol-
icies to government.97 This approach can see the deployment of multiple forms
of remedies at once including the various models developed by Landau: individ-
ual-level affirmative relief, negative injunctions, weak-form review, to structural
injunctions.98 A multidimensional approach to remedies in and of themselves
may help provide some answers to the challenges faced by relying on a weak-
form model of review that enters into inter-institutional dialogue without pro-
viding any substantive underpinning to ESR. This approach is discussed below
as the hybrid approach (employing both procedural and substantive elements).
Young develops a typology of review employed by courts when assessing ESR
claims: deferential review (placing the decision back onto the elected branches); man-
agerial review (where the court assumes direct responsibility for the substantive com-
ponent of ESR adjudication); peremptory review (where the court registers its
superiority in demanding and controlling an immediate response); experimentalist
review (where the court encourages a participative element by including relevant
stakeholders in seeking a solution) and conversational review (where the court
engages in interbranch dialogue to resolve the determination of ESR).99 The typ-
ology of review does not in itself identify a preferential approach in terms of the
strength or weakness of any one mechanism. Rather, as Young highlights, the judicial
review deployed when approaching how to enforce any one right in the particular
circumstances at hand is multidimensional.100 The typology of review is there as
a heuristic device for understanding the variety of approaches the court may take at
any one time. The various approaches available to the court therefore align with
a flexible approach to both degree of review as well as to the type of remedy
employed. In a similar sense, the principles of adjudication here can be engaged to
different degrees depending on the circumstances. Rather than set thresholds they
highlight significant points for consideration on the adjudication journey (like build-
ing blocks for ESR that can be deployed in different ways to different degrees).
At the national level in the UK human rights adjudication falls within the weak-
form review model. Yet at the same time, at the devolved level a strong-form human
rights review prevails. Declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act
1998 can be contrasted with ultra vires remedies and strike down powers of the court
under each of the devolved frameworks. Rather than align the UK or human rights
adjudication under a strong or weak form of adjudication it is clear that both strong
and weak review co-exist, with different remedies and forms of compliance engaged
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Landau, n 41.
99 Young, n 57 at 142.
100 Young, ibid. at 143.
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in some form or another at any one time. At times it may be necessary for a court to
adopt a strong review and remedy with an outcome-orientated order. At other times
it may be more appropriate for a court to adopt a deferential approach and refer the
matter back to the legislature/executive. Despite the insistent reluctance of the UK to
accept the justiciability of ESR the judicial framework is very well placed to take steps
to develop an innovative approach to remedies for ESR violations and as discussed in
Chapter 5 adjudication of ESR already occurs every day in practice across the UK but
it is piecemeal, incremental and often under the rubric of something else.101
The principles of adjudication developed here are not proposed on the basis of
strength or weakness. Nor are they proposed as a measurement tool as such or purely
heuristic. They are proposed as principles of good practice that counteract the mul-
tiple critiques of social rights discussed above, whilst at the same time requiring
a degree of flexibility in their application at any given time. They are principally
derived from deliberative democracy theory and form part of a multi-institutional
theoretical framework where responsibility for ESR, and human rights more broadly,
are the responsibility of the legislature, executive and judiciary where each must per-
tain to a substantive normative standard (either set out in the constitution or derived
from international law). In this sense, the judiciary must be equipped with flexible
principles to respond to its constitutional role as a deliberative accountability mechan-
ism. For example, whilst at times a substantive peremptory review might be called for
and a strong form of remedy deployed, at other times a deferential approach will be
required and a conversational or participative experimentalist review should be under-
taken. The principles capture the ‘adjudication journey’ and can be flexibly deployed
under weak, moderate or strong interventionist approaches by the court, and at times
an innovative approach will be required where multiple remedies are issued to deal
with different aspects of a case.
The following principles of good practice are therefore intended for consider-
ation across the ESR adjudication journey as important building blocks to be
deployed using flexibility to respond to the particular circumstances:
Principle of Accessibility
The first principle is based on accessibility and requires questioning whether access
to justice affordable/accessible? Are there barriers to accessing justice because of
legal aid or standing? This could include consideration of whether the standing test
should be expanded for public interest litigation102 and for collective cases in add-
ition to whether the legal aid rules have been sufficiently adapted to account for
ESR cases. Likewise, enabling access to that structure is paramount for the proper
administration of justice. Problems relating to legal aid are significant in the UK
context. For example, in England and Wales the introduction of the Legal Aid,
101 Boyle and Hughes, n 3.
102 See Christian Institute v Others [2015] CSIH 64, para.43–44 – standing established on EU
law grounds but not under s100 of Scotland Act as charities could not meet victim test.
Principles of ESR Adjudication 25
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’) in April 2013 has
seen the provision of legal aid decimated. The legislation removed access to legal
aid significantly in social welfare areas and only facilitated potential support for
breach of a Convention right.103 This has serious implications for access to justice
and the principle of accessibility in relation to social rights jurisprudence. The Legal
Aid Board has, for example, refused legal aid to homeless people to challenge the
criminalisation of homelessness and in response has defended its actions by indicat-
ing that such litigation could be funded through ‘crowd fund sources’.104
Importantly, access to justice consists of both procedural and substantive
claims. Whilst the literature often identifies problems around legal aid, standing
and representation there is more scope to reflect on how our substantive con-
ception of justice impacts on accessibility (if for example, civil claims engaging
with ESR are not taken sufficiently serious).105 The principles developed here
move beyond a mapping of access to justice to include a substantive component
that reflects on how a ‘fairer distribution of rights’ may be primary to justice.106
In other words, in addition to procedural access to justice the principle of acces-
sibility read together with the other principles must also revisit the structure and
substance of the definition of ‘justice’ in and of itself in any particular setting.
A broader conceptualisation and legal structure that includes ESR will be better
prepared for addressing violations and enabling effective remedies.
Principle of Participation
Does adjudication facilitate the participation of those most impacted, especially the
most marginalised? Are multi-party and structural cases facilitated when dealing with
systemic problems? Do courts have the institutional capacity and procedures to
respond to systemic societal problems? Are rights-holders able to participate in legal
processes in which they are engaged and are they able to meaningfully engage in the
outcome of those processes (including the remedies offered)? This principle is closely
linked with the deliberative quality of adjudication and the counter-majoritarian prin-
ciple in enabling the court to act as an institutional voice for the marginalised. As
103 Public Law Project, Top Legal Aid and Access to Justice Cases. Available at https://public
lawproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Top-legal-aid-and-access-to-justice-cases-
of-recent-years.pdf
104 Sarah Marsh and Patrick Greenfield, ‘Legal Aid Agency Taken to Court for Refusing to Help
Rough Sleepers’, The Guardian, 23 October 2018, available at www.theguardian.com/
society/2018/oct/23/legal-aid-agency-taken-to-court-for-refusing-to-help-rough-sleepers
105 See, for example, the claims and counter-claims to Lord Sumption’s remarks around civil
legal aid as a non-essential component of justice, Mark Elliot, ‘Civil Legal Aid as
a Constitutional Imperative: A Response to Lord Sumption’, Public Law for Everyone,
28 November 2018, available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2018/11/28/civil-
legal-aid-as-a-constitutional-imperative-a-response-to-lord-sumption/
106 Roderick MacDonald, ‘Access to Civil Justice’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010),
492–521 at 502.
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highlighted by Liebenberg, participation in decisions is an important aspect of the
maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side).107 It recognises the importance
of ensuring people have an opportunity to participate in decisions that will affect
them and an opportunity to influence the outcome of those decisions.108 The
UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Housing includes participation as a key prin-
ciple that must be enabled to ensure access to justice is secured. As part of this
principle, the UNSR highlights the importance of participation ‘in all stages of
rights claims and in the implementation of remedies’.109 In other words, all deci-
sions around ESR should include rights-holders, including the designing and
implementing of strategies and programmes. Where genuine participation has not
occurred then the court must intervene to facilitate meaningful engagement with
both the legal process as well as the remedies offered.110 Genuine participation
requires proactive steps to ensure systemic barriers are removed whether they be
physical, economic, social or cultural.111 Further, different persons will have differ-
ent needs and so participation should reflect those requirements with particular
regard to barriers faced by women, children, disabled persons, racial and ethnic
minorities, migrants, among other minority groups.
Whilst participation is a key component of access to justice it is not sufficient on its
own to ensure substantive enforcement of rights. Participation and meaningful
engagement in the adjudication process in South Africa, for example, has come
under criticism for failing to give substance to rights.112 The principle of fairness goes
some way to address this gap by encouraging participation through fair processes, as
well as substantive enforcement through stronger review and remedies where appro-
priate (in those cases demanding stronger intervention). Ultimately, the principle of
participation is about facilitating access to procedural as well as substantive justice.
Principle of Deliberation
Does the court engage in dialogic methods? Is there deliberation between institu-
tions/across jurisdictions/with key stakeholders? Does the court seek to ensure its
practice is informed, inclusive, participatory and transformative or exercising deference
where appropriate? There is a substantial body of literature that encourages ‘dialogue’
107 Liebenberg, n 65.
108 Ibid., citing Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd ed., 2012) 363.
109 UN Special Rapporteur, Access to justice for the right to housing Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living,
and on the right to nondiscrimination in this context, 15 January 2019, A/HRC/40/61.
110 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights
Disputes’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1–43 at 5–6.
111 Ibid., para.49. See also General Recommendation No. 33 (2015) on women’s access to just-
ice, para. 3; and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment
No. 16 (2005) on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic,
social and cultural rights, paras. 21 and 38.
112 Anashri Pillay, ‘Toward Effective Social and Economic Rights Adjudication: The Role of Mean-
ingful Engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732–755.
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between the legislature and executive.113 Indeed, the literature indicates that the
UK already operates within a dialogic model through the existing human rights
framework. As alluded to in Miller and argued by Eleftheriadis, the UK constitu-
tion is a ‘matter of law, open to legal deliberation and reasoning to be determined
by the legislature, the executive and the courts working together’.114 By way of
example, when the court issues a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of
the Human Rights Act it is inviting the legislature to revisit an incompatible provi-
sion in a deferential way and under a dialogic model. Deliberative adjudication can
include weak-form judicial review when appropriate where courts may take
a deferential approach and refer a matter back to the legislature115 and strong
review, where appropriate, that can include substantive review and outcome-
oriented orders, including the use of specific implement.
Deliberation should occur horizontally across institutions and vertically between
the local and supranational level. This approach engages with the principles of partici-
pation when facilitating deliberation of those impacted by court decisions. For
example, a form of deliberation might include facilitating the role of an intervener,
where a human rights institution might intervene on behalf of a group impacted.
Likewise public interest litigation can fulfil the role of a bottom-up approach to delib-
eration where systemic issues are brought before the court by key interest groups.
Deliberation can include an upwards form of dialogue with supranational and inter-
national actors, including in dialogue with UN bodies (and in response to their out-
puts) and regional and international courts (and in response to their judgments) and
an internal and local form of dialogue with domestic and devolved institutions. It
does not imply a direct line of communication but a dialectic and dialogic engage-
ment that is alive to the continuous development of social rights adjudication. In its
simplest form, this would see the court using other forms of social rights determin-
ation as interpretative sources to help inform its own approach where appropriate.
Principle of Fairness (Process and Substance)
Does adjudication ensure compliance with fair procedures? Does adjudication move
beyond procedural review where appropriate? Is adjudication informed by substantive
standards (with reference to international human rights law)? Are courts giving mean-
ing to rights? Does the substance of the decision respect the dignity of the applicant?
Are remedies employed to ensure substantive change for violations of ESR, or, alterna-
tively, is the deference to parliament/executive on the substance justified? A critique of
113 For discussion see, Sandra Fredman, ‘From Dialogue to Deliberation: Human Rights Adju-
dication and Prisoners’ Rights to Vote’ in Murray Hunt et al. (eds.), Parliaments and
Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit 152–156 (Hart Publishing, 2015),
296–297; Alison Young, Democratic Dialogue (Oxford University Press, 2017); Murray
Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’ in John Morison et al. (eds.), Judges, Transitions and
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007), 468 at 470.
114 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Two Doctrines of the Unwritten Constitution’ (2017) 13 European
Constitutional Law Review 525–550 at 549.
115 Tushnet, n 84 at 23.
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‘democratic experimentalism’ highlights the normative weakness of relying on process
of deliberation and participation alone in the determination of rights.116 Courts must
also abide by substantive and normative benchmarks, whether domestically or inter-
nationally conceived, in the determination of rights. This could include the develop-
ment of judicial review that considers whether the decision itself is fair based on an
independent examination of the evidence. Whilst this type of review is in its infancy117
there is potential for courts to develop review that takes into consideration the fairness
of substantive outcomes in terms of rights compliance. In other words, over and above
reviewing the decision-making process or the power (vires) to make the decision, is the
outcome itself compliant with ESR? Courts may therefore adopt a hybrid approach
that looks at the fairness of process and the substance of the decision/outcome.
Sometimes it may be that a violation of a right requires an outcome-orientated
substantive remedy and a deferential remedy for different parts of the same judgment.
For example, a violation of the right to adequate housing might require an order
compelling a government body to provide adequate housing for a litigant, whilst at
the same time issuing a deferential declaration regarding the reasonableness of the
government’s overarching housing strategy and a supervisory order which allows the
court to revisit the reasonableness of the policy at a future date – giving the govern-
ment an opportunity to revisit the flawed housing strategy. This hybrid approach was
evident in the Hartz IV litigation when the German Constitutional Court declared
a social security policy unfit for purpose (unreasonable) and also issued a substantive
decision on what was required to make it reasonable (that the policy should ensure
a social minimum that protects human dignity).118 A mixture of different types of
review and remedies can be used under a ‘hybrid’ form of social rights adjudication.
Expanding Grounds for Review
ESR can be adjudicated upon each of the grounds of review in the same way as CP
rights. Grounds of review tend to be classified under a threefold division:119 illegality
(unlawfulness), irrationality (unreasonableness) and procedural impropriety
(unfairness). Depending on whether the ground is procedural (procedural
116 Sandra Leibenberg and Katherine G. Young, ‘Adjudication Social and Economic Rights, Can
Democratic Experminteralism Help?’ in Helena Alviar García et al. (eds.), Social and Economic
Rights in Theory and Practice, Critical Inquiries (Routledge, 2015), 237–257 at 248.
117 For a discussion of the development of evidence-based judicial review in cases engaging with sys-
temic unfairness see Joe Tomlinson and Katy Sheridan, ‘Judicial Review, Evidence, and Systemic
Unfairness in the UK’ IACL-AIDC Blog (3 September 2018) available at https://blog-iacl-
aidc.org/blog/2018/9/3/judicial-review-evidence-and-systemic-unfairness-in-the-uk. Courts
may well start to develop substantive-based review of outcomes moving beyond an assessment of
vires in and of itself. See, for example, the court’s approach to tribunal fees in which they con-
sidered evidence on what constituted a social minimum based on criteria set by academics and
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation: R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.
118 Hartz IV, n 66.
119 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (The GCHQ case) [1985] AC
374, [1985] ICR 14.
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impropriety) or substantive (unlawful/unreasonable) will determine what type of
review the court will apply. The grounds for review are not intended to be exhaustive
or mutually exclusive.120 This means, for example that a case could be examined on
the grounds that it is potentially unlawful, unreasonable and unfair, as well as on
other potential grounds that might emerge in the future.
Intensity of Review
Depending on the grounds for review the court can employ different types of review
in the determination of ESR including reasonableness, proportionality, procedural
fairness and even anxious scrutiny. Each of the types of review can vary in intensity.
Likewise, sometimes various forms of review can be used at the same time, including
both procedural and substantive aspects. There is scope for the court to continue to
develop the intensity of review in different types of cases. Courts could, for example,
develop review techniques that also examine the fairness of the outcome of a decision
and its compatibility with rights similar to the approach adopted in theHartz IV case
in Germany.121 This type of review, whilst in its infancy in the UK, is evident in cases
such as UNISON,122 where the court considered evidence on what constituted
a social minimum when considering the fairness of tribunal fees, or in the case of RF
where the court considered the lack of empirical evidence to justify a policy
unlawful.123 This type of review is categorised below as substantive fairness.124
Table 1.2 Grounds of Review
Ground of
review
What does this mean? What kind of review might be
employed?
Illegality Was the decision lawful? A court will look at whether the
decision is within the power of the
decision maker or whether it is
ultra vires (outwith the power of
the decision maker). This is
a substantive form of review that
goes beyond looking at fair process
Irrationality Was the decision reasonable? A court will look at the decision-
making process and assess whether




Did the decision maker follow the
correct procedural rules when
making the decision?
The court will look at the fairness of
the decision-making process and the
type of review will be concerned
with the procedural aspects of the
decision
120 Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] UKHL 6 (25 July 1985).
121 Hartz IV, n 66.
122 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.
123 RF v Secretary of State for Work And Pensions [2017] EWHC 3375 (Admin).
124 See Joe Tomlinson and Katy Sheridan, ‘Judicial Review, Evidence, and Systemic Unfairness
in the UK’ IACL-AIDC Blog n 116.
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In relation to ESR it is particularly important to be aware of the difference
between different types of review such as procedural review or more substantive
Table 1.3 Intensity of Review
Intensity of review Definition – what must the judiciary ask itself ?
Reasonableness Was the decision-making process reasonable and rational? If not,
would no other sensible person applying logic have arrived at the
same outcome? (This is the UK threshold; more expansive forms
of reasonableness are discussed below)
Proportionality In the context of human rights, was the decision the most propor-
tionate way to achieve a legitimate aim when balancing out the
alternatives and taking into account the necessity of the action?
Procedural
Fairness
Did the decision-making process follow due process, was it fair?
Were all of the decision-making procedures followed correctly?
Anxious
Scrutiny125
In the context of fundamental rights decisions, does the particular
area and severity of the decision merit the judiciary taking a closer
look at the substantive and procedural aspects of the case?
Substantive
Fairness126
Over and above whether the process was fair, was the decision itself
fair based on an independent examination of the evidence? Whilst
this type of review is in its infancy127 there is potential for courts to
develop review that takes into consideration the fairness of substan-
tive outcomes in terms of rights compliance. In other words, over
and above reviewing the decision-making process or the power
(vires) to make the decision, is the outcome itself compliant with
ESR?
125 Anxious scrutiny is employed in asylum cases where the court has held that only the highest
standards of fariness will suffice, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Sittampalam Thir-
ukumar, Jordan Benjamin, Raja Cumarasuriya and Navaratnam Pathmakumar, [1989] Imm
AR 402, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), 9 March 1989; Kerrouche
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] Imm. A.R. 610. In the case of Pham
(Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 2015 UKSC 19, the
court noted that the tests of anxious scrutiny and proportionality may produce very similar
results (the tests are not the same but when engaging with fundamental rights the tests may
reach the same outcome).
126 As per Lord Steyn, ‘the rule of law in its wider sense has procedural and substantive effect’ Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Pierson, R v. [1997] UKHL 37. Whilst in this
case the issue in question was the vires of the decision of the Home Secretary to retrospectively
increase a tariff (a power the court decided he did not have) there is potential scope for the court
to move beyond this assessment to consider the substantive outcome of decisions (and whether
the decision itself is fair – or complies with ESR). In other words, the courts may begin to
develop review of the outcome of the decision based on an independent examination of the evi-
dence. See FN below and the UNISON case where the court examined evidence in establishing
what constituted a social minimum, R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. This
type of review would be required to assess components of ESC compatibility, particularly on an
assessment of the minimum core. The Hartz IV case is a comparative example where the court
assesses both the procedure and the substantive outcome of the decision.
127 For a discussion of the development of evidence-based judicial review in cases engaging with
systemic unfairness see J Tomlinson and K Sheridan, n 116. Courts may well start to develop
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review assessing the reasonableness of a decision, proportionality analysis or estab-
lishing the substantive fairness of a decision. For example, if an applicant claims that
the decision maker has failed to comply with due process, they can seek a remedy
on the grounds of procedural impropriety. This type of action could include
whether or not a decision maker has had regard to all relevant factors. For example,
if a decision maker is under a statutory duty to have due regard to an outcome this
is a right to a process (similar to the approach under section 149 of the Equality
Act or the Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 implementing
UNCRC as a relevant factor in decision-making). If the decision maker has had
due regard as part of the decision-making process then the requirement (the duty)
will be fulfilled even if this results in no substantive change to the outcome in
favour of the rights-holder.128 The duty is concerned with the lawfulness of the
process and not the lawfulness or the adequacy of the outcome.129
Reasonableness review can take on different connotations depending on the jur-
isdiction. In the UK an applicant can seek judicial review on grounds of reasonable-
ness and the court will assess the applicant’s case based on whether or not the
policy or decision relating to the provision of the right is ‘reasonable’. The thresh-
old for unreasonableness is high in jurisprudence across the UK. Based on the well-
developed Wednesbury reasonableness test an action (or omission) must be ‘so out-
rageous and in defiance of logic…that no sensible person who had applied his mind
to the question… could have arrived at it’.130 This degree of review means that the
onus of proving ‘unreasonableness’ rests with the applicant and that the court
requires a high degree of ‘irrationality’ to find a matter unreasonable. Whilst this
works well in relation to some areas of human rights law it may not be suitable or
appropriate for all alleged human rights violations. For example, there is
a difference in challenging whether or not a long-term policy is fit for purpose or
the immediate need of someone who is living in absolute destitution. The latter
may compel a more interventionist approach than the former.
An expanded form of reasonableness review has been the type of review
employed in South Africa.131 In the context of ESR, it has been understood as
a right to a reasonable policy (p) to access a right (x).132 In other words, the
court assesses the policy or strategy seeking to achieve the right [p(x)] rather
substantive-based review of outcomes moving beyond an assessment of vires in and of itself. See,
for example, the court’s approach to tribunal fees in which they considered evidence on what
constituted a social minimum based on criteria set by academics and the Joseph Rowntree Foun-
dation:R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.
128 There is no jurisprudence on the Welsh Measure, however, the court’s approach to the due
regard duty is evident in a number of cases under the Equality Act 2010 (discussed in
Chapter 5).
129 MA & Ors, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014]
EWCA Civ 13 (21 February 2014) para.92.
130 Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
131 For example, see the reasonableness test as applied in Government of the Republic of South
Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
132 Amartya Sen, ‘The Right Not to be Hungry’ in Philip Alston et al. (eds.), The Right to Food
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 70.
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than outcome [(x)]. In the case of Grootboom, the court assessed the reasonable-
ness of the housing policy in South Africa and determined that the state had
not gone far enough in providing housing for those in desperate need thus
acting unreasonably.133 The outcome was that the state was required to revisit
its housing strategy (this did not provide an immediately enforceable right to
housing for Mrs Grootboom). Sometimes remedies may have no immediate
material impact that results in transformative change for a particular applicant,
but the longer-term symbolism of the court’s interjection will create the space
for broader societal change and there are still substantive components to this
approach (i.e. the longer-term outcome of a revised housing strategy).134
This broader approach to reasonableness facilitates a more substantive, or
thicker, conception of justice than purely procedural review. South African juris-
prudence has developed reasonable review that encompasses substantive stand-
ards. These standards include reviewing the reasonableness of state action by
assessing whether the approach adopted to realise ESR is coherent, balanced,
flexible, comprehensive, workable and non-discriminatory135 as well as whether
there has been meaningful engagement in the decision-making process.136 In
addition, it compels states to adopt measures that have taken into account the
most marginalised groups and prioritise grave situations or situations of serious
risk (invoking theories of prioritisation).137 Importantly, the UK test of Wednes-
bury reasonableness falls significantly short of these broader substantive ‘reason-
able’ standards as conceived of in the South African approach.
The development of proportionality analysis has been an important development in
UK jurisprudence in the wake of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) litigation and arguably now performs a role as both a common law ground
of review138 as well as potentially imposing a greater intensity of review when it is
invoked.139 Once a prima facie breach of a right has been found, proportionality, in
its most widely conceived theoretical exposition140 asks whether the infringement
pursues a legitimate aim?; second, was the measure necessary (was there no alternative,
less restrictive approach)?; third, on balance, do the benefits outweigh the costs
133 Grootboom, n 131.
134 Garavito and Franco, n 79 at 19–21.
135 Katharine G. Young, ‘Proportionality, Reasonableness, and Economic and Social Rights’ in
Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds.), Proportionality, New Frontiers and New Challenges
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), 248–273 at 254.
136 Anashri Pillay, ‘Toward Effective Social and Economic Rights Adjudication: The Role of
Meaningful Engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law
732–755.
137 Young, n 135at 269.
138 Meaning it can be applied in cases engaging with fundamental rights beyond ECHR
jurisprudence.
139 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 and
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19.
140 The UK approach is still rather reticent to the broadest interpretation of proportionality. See
obiter dicta Pham ibid. as per Lord Mance para.95–97.
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imposed on the rights-holder?141 Nonetheless, even with more substantive review on
the grounds of reasonableness or proportionality the violation of a right might not
necessarily be addressed. This relates to the fact that not all rights are immediately
enforceable (they are derogable) and the enforcement of rights of different persons
will no doubt require a balancing act. The question remains, are there some circum-
stances where a more interventionist approach around substantive enforcement might
be required – such as for example, when the violation breaches the dignity of the
applicant,142 where the breach causes conditions to fall below a minimum core/social
minimum,143 or where there is a breach of a peremptory threshold as set out in statute
(see the discussion below).
A more interventionist approach might rest on a challenge to the standard of
provision of an ESR on the grounds that it is manifestly unfair based on one of
the grounds identified (dignity/minimum/peremptory). So rather than focuss-
ing purely on procedural justice, reasonableness or proportionality, asking the
court to assess the fairness of the actual substantive outcome. In in the Hartz
IV case, the German Constitutional Court assessed whether the substantive out-
come of a policy as well as the process leading to the outcome was substantively
fair.144 The court adopted a hybrid approach to judicial review where they
assessed the decision-making process as well as the fairness of the outcome. The
court found that the process was flawed, and that the outcome of that process
was unfair. The more substantive degree of review meant that the public body
had to revisit the process as well as the outcome in order to comply with the
court’s decision. This is a more absolutist approach.
In terms of developing ESR adjudication courts in the UK will require to
move beyond the traditional reasonableness review and develop other means of
assessing human rights compliance. For example, this could manifest as a more
thorough form of reasonableness review beyond ‘irrationality’ to encompass
more substantive elements, including aspects of proportionality. Based on the
South African approach the UN CESCR has for example developed reasonable-
ness as a test that takes into consideration the following factors:
• The extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and tar-
geted towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.
• Whether discretion was exercised in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary
manner.
• Whether resource allocation is in accordance with international human
rights standards.
141 Young, n 135 at 257. See also Alexy (the original proponent of the proportionality model of
review). Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002).
142 As seen in Colombian jurisprudence around mínimo vital – discussed in more detail in
Chapter 4.
143 Ibid., see also the example of German jurisprudence including Hartz IV, n 66.
144 Hartz IV, ibid.
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• Whether the State party adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights.
• Whether the steps were taken within a reasonable timeframe.
• Whether the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalised indi-
viduals or groups has been addressed.
• Whether policies have prioritised grave situations or situations of risk.
• Whether decision-making is transparent and participatory.145
Similar consideration could be given for example to tests of proportionality, aspects
of which are evident in the expansive reasonableness test above, and which allow
a court to weigh up the different considerations a public body has had regard to in
making a determination. Again, this approach may not take into account whether or
not the substantive outcome is unfair. Sometimes this type of review is the most
appropriate but again, if the situation relates for example to a non-derogable compo-
nent proportionality may not be enough. These different considerations all relate to
what degree courts might enforce rights along the respect, protect, fulfil analogy.
The process v substance dimension of social rights adjudication remains to
a large degree unsettled in the literature and practice. Here I propose that
there are two approaches where the substance of rights must feature more
prominently in the adjudication of the court. The first approach is when the
violation is so obvious and severe as to directly impact on the applicant’s dig-
nity and meaningful enjoyment of the minimum level of rights, the dignity
or social minimum threshold.146 In this instance, the court must intervene
with a substantive enforcement and outcome-orientated order. The second
approach is for the court to be more proactive in responding to instructions
placed upon the decision maker by the legislature, the peremptory threshold.
For example, if the legislature instructs the decision maker to have ‘due
regard’ to an outcome, or to implement a policy that seeks to achieve the
outcome, then the peremptory threshold is not met as no substantive out-
come is anticipated or guaranteed. Whereas, if the legislature instructs the
decision maker to establish and meet a person’s need in the provision of
a right then the peremptory threshold is met because the legislature antici-
pated and guaranteed a substantive outcome. When the assessment of need is
carried out this should materialise, or crystallise, into a duty to fulfil or realise
145 Bruce Porter, Rethinking Progressive Realisation, Social Rights Advocacy Centre (2015) at
6 and United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation
of the Obligation to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ under an Optional
Protocol to the Covenant, UNCESCROR, 38th Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1, (2007);
Malcolm Langford, ‘Closing the Gap? – An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic
Journal of Human Rights 2; General comment No. 3 (1990) on the nature of States parties’
obligations, para. 2; UNSR on Housing, Access to Justice Report, n 109, para.25–27.
146 See Fredman, n 64 . For a discussion on human dignity as a principle of human rights adju-
dication see Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford University
Press, 2005).
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the particular right meaning a substantive outcome is enforceable by the
court.147 In other words, the court should be prepared to enforce
a substantive outcome when the decision maker fails to follow the instruc-
tions placed upon it by the legislature to do so.
Counter-majoritarian Principle
Is adjudication elite-driven? Has the court taken steps to review the holistic impli-
cations? Has the court considered whether the judgment will further marginalise
vulnerable groups? If ESR are engaged, is the person/group impacted by the vio-
lation excluded from influencing change in a pro-majoritarian political system?
Table 1.4 Classification of Innovative Approach to Procedural v Substantive
Remedies148
Weak ModerateType of right
Right to a fair pro-
cess (for ex. due
regard)











(for ex. have due





to realise right (for
ex. establish
national strategy
to fulfil a right)
Duty-bearer must realise
right – through process or
policy or other means –

































Was the decision fair? (vires
and substance)
Apply a threshold to measure
compliance
(Continued )
147 See the judicial commentary on crystallisation of duties in McGregor v South Lanarkshire
Council 2001 SC 502. Examples of statutory needs assessment can be found in s37(1) of
the Children and Families Act or s12A Social Care (Scotland) Act 1968.
148 This table is developed from the remedy typology developed by Tushnet n 84 and expanded
upon by Garavito and Franco, n 79 at 10. See Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for further discussions on
the cases mentioned.
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Table 1.4 (Cont.)
Weak ModerateType of right
Right to a fair pro-
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We do not have enough
resources to achieve x150
149 The cases mentioned here are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 5 and 6.
150 This defence may not be insufficient in terms of fulfilling a statutory obligation see, for
example, MacGregor v South Lanarkshire Council 2001 SC 502 and R v Gloucestershire
County Council (Ex p Barry) [1997] AC 584.
Where persons or groups are politically marginalised Landau has argued that
the court can become an important institutional voice for those who cannot
seek recourse through pro-majoritarian politics.151 Deliberative models of
adjudication must take into account the potential unequal bargaining power
of participants. The danger is that the inherent inequality between the parties
in ESR adjudication can undermine inclusive deliberation unless genuine
agency is facilitated for the marginalised.152 For example, costly litigation can
exclude those who cannot afford litigation and adversarial litigation can
exacerbate structural inequalities. This can create a ‘disenfranchisement effect’
where the experience of poverty prohibits genuine participation in delibera-
tive processes, including adjudication.153 The danger of the court acting as
a pro-hegemonic exercise of power can be balanced through facilitating struc-
tural remedies to deal with systemic problems.154 This will only work if other
principles are adhered to, including the need to ensure access to justice is
affordable and accessible.
The Colombian Constitutional Court has heard and decided ‘structural’ cases
where it considers whether an ‘unconstitutional set of affairs’ requires to be
remedied.155 Usually this will involve multiple applicants (collective cases) and
will allow the court to review whether the state can remedy a systemic problem
engaging multiple stakeholders and multiple defendants.
These types of structural cases tend to:
(1) affect a large number of people who allege a violation of their rights, either
directly or through organisations that litigate the cause;
(2) implicate multiple government agencies found to be responsible for perva-
sive public policy failures that contribute to such rights violations; and
(3) involve structural injunctive remedies, i.e., enforcement orders whereby courts
instruct various government agencies to take coordinated actions to protect the
entire affected population and not just the specific complainants in the case.156
If structural issues arise in relation to ESR it would not be beyond the reach of
the legislature, executive and judiciary to work together to remedy the matter.157
151 Landau, n 41. See also Mantouvalou in Gearty and Mantouvalou n 75.
152 Leidenberg and Young, n 93 at 251.
153 Ibid.
154 Landau, n 41.
155 For an in-depth discussion on this see César Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom:
The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89
Texas Law Review 1669–1698.
156 Ibid. at 1671.
157 Such as the response by the executive and legislature to introduce emergency legislation to
deal with the fall out of systemic human rights violations following the Cadder judmgment.
See Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43 (26 October 2010) and
the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010.
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For example, if a systemic problem arises in relation to human rights protection
then there could be a role for the court to supervise whether the legislature and/or
executive could take steps to remedy this through a form of structural injunction.
Landau argues that addressing violations of social rights through a structural
approach to remedies facilitates a form of social rights adjudication that positively
impacts on the lives of poorer citizens and prioritises the most vulnerable.158
Remedial Principle
Are the remedies appropriate and are they effective? Are they procedural or substan-
tive in nature? Are they deferential where appropriate and outcome-orientated
where appropriate? Are they participative and are there sufficient monitoring mech-
anisms to ensure compliance? Are structural remedies used where appropriate?159
The approach to remedies requires a much broader and deeper understanding as to
how the court can respond in a dialogic manner whilst also protecting the most
vulnerable and those most in need with outcome-orientated orders when appropri-
ate. Garavito claims that this approach to adjudication works best when courts
clearly affirm the justiciability of the right in question (strong rights); leave the
policy decisions to the elected branches of power whilst laying out a clear roadmap
for measuring progress (moderate remedies); and actively monitor the implementa-
tion of the court’s orders through participatory mechanisms like public hearings,
progress reports and follow-up decisions (strong monitoring).160
In addition, courts must also balance this principle with the principle of
substantive fairness and intervene with stronger outcome-orientated remedies
where appropriate (employing the social minimum or peremptory thresholds).
A flexible approach to adjudication and to the principles of adjudication
enables courts to weigh up the most appropriate remedy in any given con-
text. This means developing remedies to meet the most urgent of needs in
serious violations as well as remedies that respond to broader claims around
progressive realisation, revenue generation and allocation, as well as national
strategies to fulfil rights.
Ultimately courts should have a constellation of remedies readily available
to them. What is remedially appropriate in any given case will be dependent
on a number of factors (number of applicants, degree of interference with
the right, complexity of resource allocation, number of defendants, fairness
of the outcome and so on). The overriding principle must be that the
remedy adopted in any given case is ‘effective in protecting and vindicating
158 Landau, n 41 at 189–247. See also Mantouvalou in Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouva-
lou, Debating Social Rights (Hart, 2011).
159 For a discussion on the different types of remedies available for social rights see Malcolm
Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito and Julieta Rossi (eds.), Social Rights Judgments and the
Politics of Compliance: Making It Stick (Cambridge University Press, 2017) and Boyle, n 1.
160 Rodríguez-Garavito, n 138 at 1692.
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the rights at issue and responsive to the circumstances at hand’.161 As Porter
identifies:
there is no universally preferred social rights remedial and enforcement strat-
egy. Social rights claimants do not always aspire to achieve broader structural
change or transformative effect. If a claimant requires only a correction to an
existing entitlement system in order to secure housing, food or healthcare, per-
haps qualifying for an already existing benefit, the most effective and appropri-
ate remedy may be one of immediate application, applying to a single
entitlement, identifying a single respondent government [agency]. In other
cases […] claimants may undertake litigation with clearly transformative aims,
identifying multiple entitlements and respondents and demanding the imple-
mentation of ongoing strategies with meaningful engagement and stake-
holders. It is important to ensure that range of remedial and enforcement
strategies are employed and effective enforcement is in place in all cases.162
Ultra vires – damages or outcome orientated orders
Structural injunctions and collective cases
Delayed remedies and multi-institutional dialogue
Exercising supervisory jurisdiction and follow 
up, participation of those impacted
Declarations of incompatibility - deferential
Developing innovative remedies
Figure 1.1 Developing Innovative Remedies
161 Bruce Porter, ‘Canada: Systemic Claims and Remedial Diversity’, in Malcolm Langford
et al. (eds.), n 48 201–254 at 204.
162 Ibid., 205–206.
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The legal definition of what constitutes an effective remedy in international
law is discussed in the next chapter.
Some Key Definitions
For the purposes of the book, it may be helpful to clarify some key definitions. The
rights referred to as ‘economic and social rights’ (or ESR) refer to the broad category
of rights enunciated in international law such as the right to education, the right to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, labour
rights, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to adequate housing, the
right to social security, amongst others.163 The definition of incorporation adopted is
the domestication of international norms coupled with access to an effective remedy
for a violation. Sometimes incorporation can be direct – such as through direct refer-
ence to an international treaty.164 Sometimes incorporation can be indirect, such as
through the constitutionalisation or legalisation of a right mirroring an international
normative standard implicitly but not explicitly. And sometimes incorporation of
a right can be sectoral, where for example the right to adequate housing is
163 Examples of economic rights include labour rights, examples of social rights include the
right to education, the right to adequate housing, the right to health, the right to freedom
from destitution and so on. ESR more broadly protect vulnerable groups such as those
with disabilities, children, the elderly, minority communities or those who are
unemployed. The rights protected in international law fall under treaties such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, UN General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993,
p. 3; the European Social Charter (Revised) 1996, Council of Europe, ETS 163; the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child 1989, UN General Assembly, resolution 44/25 of
20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3; the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 1979, UN General Assembly reso-
lution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13; the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1965, United Nations General
Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
660, p. 195; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, United
Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/61/106 of 24 January 2007, 76th plenary
meeting; issued in GAOR, 61st sess., Suppl. no. 49. ‘Annex: Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities’: pp. 2–29. ‘Economic, social and cultural rights’ sometimes
referred to as simply ‘economic and social rights’ (as they are in this book), or socio-
economic rights. Cultural rights, per se, can engage with a very different normative and
conceptual debates relating to minority rights, rights to cultural identity, the meaning of
‘culture’, multicultural citizenship and so forth (see, for example, Siobhán Mullally,
Gender, Culture and Human Rights: Reclaiming Universalism, (Hart 2006) . It is not
within the ambit of this book to draw on this wider engagement in the literature relating
to cultural rights. However, the book recognises the indivisibility of all rights and that,
whilst sub-categories may exist and are important to recognise, the categorisation of ‘eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights’ can be synonymous with ‘economic and social rights’,
‘socio-economic rights’ or simply ‘social rights’.
164 See, for example, the constitution of Argentina (Article 25) or the Norwegian Human
Rights Act 1999.
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provided for under housing legislation, or the right to social security under
social security legislation. Essentially domestic incorporation of international
norms, be that direct, implicit or sectoral, should be both derived from and
inspired by the international legal framework and should at all times be
coupled with an effective remedy for a violation of a right.165 Forms of legal
integration that do not facilitate access to a remedy for a violation of a right
cannot amount to incorporation but should be defined as a means of imple-
mentation, rather than incorporation.
The term justiciability refers to the adjudication of a right by a court.166 It
is important to note that justiciability does not necessarily mean, or equate
to, full compliance or enforcement of a right. Some justiciability mechanisms
may be weaker than others depending upon how the right, and associated
duties, are formulated in law and how willing the court is to engage with
enforcement in any given context. Nonetheless, as discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2, justiciability can be either (or both) a means of implementation
along a scale of enforcement and an important accountability mechanism that
ensures either partial or full compliance. Justiciability itself can therefore be
measured on a scale between weak enforcement and strong enforcement. The
book looks at different models of incorporation and justiciability across this
spectrum contextualised within the principles of adjudication discussed above.
165 Katie Boyle, Models of Incorporation and Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Scottish Human Rights Commission, (2018) at 14. See also UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 19: The right to
social security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), 4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19. Para.77–80;
UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repar-
ation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly,
21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant,
3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para.4.
166 See, for example, the definition provided by Dennis and Stewart, ‘Among scholars and non-
governmental advocates, the term ‘justiciability’ seems to be used most often to refer merely
to the existence of a mechanism or procedure to resolve alleged violation of the rights in
question. In this view, rights (or disputes about rights) are justiciable when there is
a mechanism capable of adjudicating them, and non-justiciable when one is lacking.’
Michael Dennis and David Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to
Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 The American Journal of International Law
462; or by Arambulo, ‘Justiciability of a human rights means that a court of law or another
type of supervisory body deems the right concerned to be amenable to judicial scrutiny’,
Kitty Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (Hart Intersentia, 1999),
16–18; or by Craven, ‘[T]he justiciability of a particular issue depends, not on the quality of
the decision, but rather on the authority of the body to make the decision.’, Mathew
Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, A Perspective
on Its Development (Clarendon Press and OUP, 1995), 102.
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Structure of the Book
This book is divided into six chapters, each focussing on aspect of how ESR can
be better embedded in our legal systems in a way that can facilitate an approach
to ESR adjudication based on flexible principles of good practice derived from
deliberative democracy theory. As this chapter highlights, ESR and their judicial
enforcement remain contested in the UK discourse, and yet the discourse and
practice has moved on both internationally and comparatively, meaning an ESR
accountability gap has emerged. The principles of adjudication set out in this
chapter seek to contribute to the international discourse whilst offering a new
lens through which to view ESR in the UK context specifically. They address
the first and second critical waves of ESR justiciability (i.e. the anti-democratic
critique; the indeterminacy critique; the capacity critique; and the pro-
hegemonic critique). The principles include: the accessibility principle; the par-
ticipation principle; the principle of deliberation; the principle of fairness; the
counter-majoritarian principle and the remedial principle. They frame the discus-
sion throughout the following five chapters.
The second chapter looks at the status of ESR in international law arguing
that recourse to an effective (judicial) remedy now forms part of state obliga-
tions to progressively realise ESR. Chapter 2 revisits the original separation of
human rights that occurred during the development of the International Bill of
Rights and explains how this bifurcation of rights into different categories (civil
and political v economic, social and cultural) has been misunderstood resulting
in a false dichotomy of rights. The legal position now acknowledges that access
to justice in and of itself is a right, and this includes the need to develop effect-
ive remedies for violations of all human rights. Responding to this need requires
innovation and imagination if legal systems are to be properly equipped to
ensure access to effective remedies.
The third chapter focusses on the regional human rights frameworks as they
apply regionally and in the UK. In particular the chapter sets out how EU law
and the treaties associated with the Council of Europe, in particular the ECHR,
form important pillars of the UK constitution. Both of these regional systems
protect ESR to different degrees, and both of the European frameworks are at
risk of being lost as part of regressive human rights reform in the domestic
sphere. This chapter sets out the particular risks to human rights as a result of
Brexit and the UK’s fluctuating position in relation to retaining or repealing the
Human Rights Act 1998 (thus risking the status of the ECHR and protection
of human rights in domestic law). It also sets out the potential of regional
mechanisms not yet fully explored, including the revised European Social Char-
ter and the work of the European Committee of Social Rights.
Chapter 4 addresses the constitutional resistance to human rights in the
UK and places this discussion within a wider comparative context drawing
from models of constitutionalism that favour both parliamentary and judicial
supremacy. The chapter explains that the UK exists in a state of flux between
different models of constitutionalism (legal v political; framework v process)
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and that the devolved lens completely reframes the way in which rights
can be understood as forming a substantive component of the rule of law.
Chapter 4 looks at different models of constitutionalism and how states seek
to holistically (or not) address human rights, including ESR, in their consti-
tutional arrangements.
The fifth chapter sets out the ways in which ESR adjudication occurs. The
‘justiciability mechanisms’ are framed as models and assessed with reference to
the principles of adjudication. The justiciability mechanisms include the type of
adjudication that already occurs (under the statutory framework broadly speak-
ing; under equality law; through the dynamic interpretation of CPR; and as part
of common law incorporation of international human rights law) as well as
future mechanisms – i.e. how the justiciability of ESR might occur in the future
(recourse to an international or regional ESR complaints mechanism; and/or
a renewed constitutional framework through an Economic and Social Rights
Act or codified constitution).
This chapter explores the definition of ‘incorporation’ proposing that incorp-
oration can take on many different forms, crucially however, it requires the cre-
ation of rights coupled with effective remedies meaning weaker models of
implementation, whilst helpful, are not the same as incorporation of rights. Jus-
ticiability can at times be a means of implementation (it can facilitate the
enforcement of rights) without necessarily ensuring full compliance. It also has
the potential to be an accountability mechanism – the stronger the model of
incorporation, the more scope there is for accountability. The book orientates
models of justiciability and incorporation towards a multi-institutional constitu-
tional model. This model is the best means of ensuring access to justice for ESR
(and CPR) and recognises that the legislature, executive and judiciary each have
a role to play in upholding human rights.
The sixth chapter sets out the means through which ESR are developing
in the devolved frameworks of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. The
book highlights that there is no universal human rights and equality frame-
work that applies across the UK and that the trajectories of the devolved
regions have completely transformed the way in which human rights are
framed. Chapter 6 highlights the significant steps already taken by the
devolved legislatures with respect to implementing and observing inter-
national human rights law such as through the Children and Young Persons
(Wales) Measure 2011; the Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018; the recom-
mendations of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for a (now
suspended) Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland; and the recommendations of
the First Minister’s Advisory Group on Human Rights Leadership in Scotland
on the incorporation of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights
into Scots law.
Overall, the book seeks to offer ways forward for ESR according to the prin-
ciples of adjudication and the particular justiciability mechanisms available under
different forms of incorporation (constitutionalisation) of rights. In particular it
gives practical examples of how the legislature, executive and judiciary can act as
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guarantors of rights and proposes that the court must act as an accountability
mechanism, and a means of last resort, should other institutional mechanisms
fail. In so doing, it seeks to propel the national discourse beyond discussions
around regressive human rights reform and presents pathways to better protect
ESR both within the UK and beyond.
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